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What is the effect of an assignment of the reversion on a put 
option contained in a lease? 
 
 
Justice Mullins of the Queensland Supreme Court recently considered the 
status of a put option contained in a registered lease in circumstances where 
there was an assignment of the reversion.  The matter arose for determination 
in Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 307. 
 
The decision is of interest as a lease containing a put option, exercisable by a 
landlord, is perhaps less commonly encountered than a lease containing a 
call option, exercisable by a tenant. 
 
Background 
 
Denham Bros Ltd (“the lessee”) entered a registered lease with the State 
Government Insurance Office (Queensland) (“SGIO”) which lease contained 
two options for renewal. 
 
Clause 33 of the registered lease contained a put option whereby SGIO (as 
the lessor) could call upon the lessee to purchase the demised premises at a 
specified price and upon specified terms.  SGIO could exercise the put option 
if the lessee failed to exercise either of its two option of renewal. 
 
During the initial term of the lease, SGIO transferred the land the subject of 
the lease to W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd (“Freestone”).  The first option for 
renewal was duly exercised but the lessee did not exercise the second option 
for renewal.  As a consequence of the lessee not exercising the second 
option, Freestone asserted its right to enforce clause 33 of the lease. 
 
In asserting its right to enforce the put option Freestone relied, in part, on the 
terms of a Deed by which SGIO assigned absolutely to Freestone all the right, 
title and interest of SGIO under the registered lease including the option under 
clause 33 and Freestone accepted the assignment of SGIO’s right, title, 
estate, benefits and interests under the lease.  The Deed recited that the 
parties had agreed to enter the Deed “to more perfectly give effect to the 
original contract between them by assigning the Lessor’s benefits under the 
said Lease.”  Freestone’s solicitors, by a letter addressed to the lessee, gave 
notice of the assignment to their client of SGIO’s right, title and interest under 
the lease including the option under clause 33 and provided the lessee with a 
copy of the Deed. 
 
For its part, the lessee denied that the put option contained in clause 33 of the 
lease could be exercised by Freestone.  Ultimately Justice Mullins had to 
consider three key submissions by the lessee. 
 
First, the lessee submitted that s117 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) 
applies only to a covenant in a lease that touches and concerns the land and 
clause 33 was not such a covenant.  The validity of this submission was 
conceded which meant that Freestone could not rely on s117 as giving it the 
power to enforce the put option. 
 
Secondly it was submitted that the benefit of the put option in clause 33 was 
personal to SGIO and could not be validly assigned to Freestone. 
 
The third submission was that there was no privity of contract between 
Freestone and the lessee. 
 
Could the put option be assigned with the reversion? 
 
In reaching a decision Mullins J had to first determine if the put option could 
be assigned together with the reversion.  After reviewing a number of 
authorities, Justice Mullins noted that although an option is collateral to the 
relationship of landlord and tenant and therefore not a covenant that runs with 
the land it is nevertheless assignable unless the terms of the grant of the 
option show that the option is personal.  Subject to this restriction, the option 
is assignable at law as a chose in action.  Whilst the authorities that supported 
this conclusion dealt with options to purchase exercisable by tenants, Justice 
Mullins could see no reason why such authorities could not be applied by 
analogy to a put option for the benefit of a landlord. 
 
Was the benefit of the option personal? 
 
There were two aspects to the lessee’s submission that the benefit of the put 
option in clause 33 was personal to SGIO.  As a matter of construction of the 
lease itself the lessee submitted that the benefit was personal.  Secondly, the 
lessee wished to rely on extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the intention of the 
parties to confine the benefit of the put option to SGIO. 
 
In construing clause 33 it was held that there was no reason to require the 
term “Lessor” to be read down such that it should be treated as a reference to 
the original landlord only nor was there any ambiguity such that it was 
necessary to consider extrinsic evidence as an aid to interpretation.  Even if 
the extrinsic evidence was admissible, Justice Mullins opined that the result 
would be unchanged. 
 
Was the put option a legal chose in action? 
 
For the lessee it was submitted that the right conferred by clause 33 was 
future property and therefore only a right that could be assigned in equity.  
This submission was dealt with relatively swiftly.  Although at the date of the 
transfer of the reversion the right was exercisable in the future it was 
nevertheless an existing right.  As a legal chose in action the right conferred 
by clause 33 was assigned either when the reversion was assigned to 
Freestone or, if not, when it was assigned by the Deed. 
 
Upon the assignment of the legal chose in action s199 of the Property Law 
Act 1974 (Qld) created privity of contract between Freestone and the lessee, 
thereby dispensing with the lessee’s contention to the contrary. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Justice Mullin’s decision provides useful guidance concerning the treatment of 
a put option contained in a lease in circumstances where there is a transfer of 
the reversion.  It appears that a put option will be treated in the same manner 
as the more commonly encountered option to purchase or call option.  When 
contained in a lease, neither put nor call options touch and concern the land 
and neither will run with the reversion.  However, like an option to purchase, a 
put option is a legal chose in action that is capable of assignment pursuant to 
s199 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) unless, as a matter of construction, 
the grant of the option is considered personal. 
 
If the option is considered assignable, it remains prudent practice for the 
benefit of the option to be assigned by a separate instrument, as occurred in 
this instance. 
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